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LOGIC OF PROBABILITY AND CONJECTURE
HARRY CRANE
Abstract. I introduce a formalization of probability in intensional Martin-Löf
type theory (MLTT) and homotopy type theory (HoTT) which takes the concept of
‘evidence’ as primitive in judgments about probability. In parallel to the intuition-
istic conception of truth, in which ‘proof’ is primitive and an assertion A is judged
to be true just in case there is a proof witnessing it, here ‘evidence’ is primitive and
A is judged to be probable just in case there is evidence supporting it. To formalize
this approach, we regard propositions as types in MLTT and define for any proposi-
tion A a corresponding probability type Prob(A) whose inhabitants represent pieces
of evidence in favor of A. Among several practical motivations for this approach, I
focus here on its potential for extending meta-mathematics to include conjecture,
in addition to rigorous proof, by regarding a ‘conjecture in A’ as a judgment that
‘A is probable’ on the basis of evidence.
1. Introduction
I aim to develop a formal logic of probability and conjecture which takes judgments
about evidence as primitive and whose calculus is based on rules for reasoning about
such judgments. I focus specifically here on the formal approach and its basic technical
consequences. Much more can be said about a wide range of philosophical, historical,
and technical motivations underlying this work, including its potential implications for
understanding how probability and evidence often arise in legal proceedings, scientific
discovery, and everyday decision making. For these additional considerations, I refer
the reader to the longer version of this article [Cra18].
The study of conjecture and plausible reasoning in mathematics provides one con-
crete motivation for the theory introduced here. Although conjecture is central to
mathematical practice, and is often a necessary precursor to rigorous proof, there
lacks a ‘meta-mathematical’ framework for analyzing how heuristics and intuitions
guide formal ‘rigorous’ mathematics. But although conjecture and plausible reason-
ing do not obey strict logical rules, they seem to follow a sound rationale based on
some commonly applicable techniques; see, e.g., Pólya’s two volume work [Pól54] and
Mazur’s more recent discussion [Maz12]. For example, let A and B be mathematical
propositions. Though it may seem logical for a mathematician who (i) conjectures A
and (ii) has proven A→ B (i.e., if A then B) to also conjecture B, there exists no for-
mal theory to justify the move. We could attempt to formalize this rule by combining
the conventional probability calculus (i.e., set Pr(Q) = 1 if Q is true and Pr(Q) = 0 if
¬Q is true) with a Lockean thesis for belief (i.e., conjecture A if ‘Pr(A) ≥ t’ for some
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pre-determined threshold 0 ≤ t ≤ 1) [Fol92].1 In this case, since A → B ≡ ¬A ∨ B
has been proven, we have Pr(¬A ∨B) = 1, and since A is conjectured we must have
Pr(A) ≥ t by the Lockean thesis. A routine application of the probability calculus
gives Pr(¬A) ≤ 1− t and
1 = Pr(¬A ∨B) ≤ Pr(¬A) + Pr(B) ⇒ Pr(B) ≥ t,
leading to a conjecture in B. But whereas in classical logic any proposition Q is either
true or false by the law of excluded middle, a conjecture about Q under this approach
relies on the extra-mathematical data encoded by the probability operator Pr(·) and
the Lockean threshold t.
Here I seek a logic in which truths and conjectures can be treated as mathematical
objects of equal standing, thus allowing ‘plausible reasoning’ in mathematics to be
studied internally to the same formal system in which rigorous mathematics already
takes place. From this perspective, the logical rules governing ‘rigorous mathematics’,
which is concerned only with truth and proof and not with conjecture and evidence,
are a fragment of a more general framework that also incorporates conjecture. I
achieve this by introducing a concept of probability on top of the existing syntax of
Martin-Löf intensional type theory (MLTT) [ML84,ML87,ML96], and by interpreting
a ‘conjecture in A’ as a formal judgment that ‘A is probable’ in the type theory.2
1.1. Meaning of a conjecture. Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘meaning as use’ [Wit73]
figures into Martin-Löf’s meaning explanation of types [ML87,ML96] and the Curry–
Howard ‘propositions as types’ correspondence [Cur34,CF,How69], by which a math-
ematical proposition A is represented as a type A : Type whose terms a : A are
proofs of A:
“the meaning of a proposition [...] is determined by that which counts
as a verification of it.” (Martin-Löf [ML96, p. 27])
Following Martin-Löf, we formalize probability in terms of evidence, by associating
each proposition A : Type to a probability type Prob(A) : Type whose terms
a′ : Prob(A) correspond to pieces of evidence in favor of A. In this case, the judgment
a′ : Prob(A) indicates that ‘a′ is evidence for A’ (or that a′ witnesses the probability
of A). In the example discussed above, the conjecture in A corresponds to a judgment
a′ : Prob(A), the truth of A→ B corresponds to a proof f : A→ B, and the derived
conjecture in B results from the formal judgment impf (a) : Prob(B),3 which can
be constructed by applying the elimination rule (4) for the probability type in the
1There are other frameworks for belief revision, some based on the probability calculus and some
not. I present this one here only for illustration. See [SF18,AGM85] and references therein for more
detailed accounts.
2In the specific application to meta-mathematics for conjecture, I interpret the judgment that ‘A
is probable’ to correspond to a conjecture in A. My natural language use of ‘probable’ differs from
the use of ‘plausible’ in [Pól54,Maz12] on the grounds that mere ‘plausibility’ is not sufficient to
conjecture A. In order to conjecture A, one must believe that A is ‘likely’ or ‘probable’ on the basis
of the observed evidence, not that it is merely ‘plausible’.
3In MLTT the ‘proof’ f : A → B is simply a function which converts any proof of A (i.e., a : A)
into a proof of B (i.e., f(a) : B).
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upcoming formalism. Thus, in parallel to Martin-Löf’s meaning explanation of truth
in terms of proof, we obtain a meaning explanation of probability in terms of evidence:
the meaning of a conjecture is determined by that which counts as
evidence in favor of it.4
Before beginning, I note that the intuitionistic approach to probability presented
here seems to be autonomous from other conceptions of probability found throughout
the literature, including Weatherson’s work on ‘intuitionistic probability’ [Wea03]. In
particular, I am not aware of any previous type-theoretic accounts of probability or
any other formalism which treats conjectures as first class mathematical objects in
their own right. I also note that the concept of ‘probability’ invoked here is intended
in a purely epistemic sense, and thus is best compared and contrasted with other
accounts of logical and subjective probability in [Car50, dF, Ram26]. Though not
presented in traditional ‘theorem-proof’ style, the numbered statements in the coming
sections can be proven rigorously. To aid the exposition, I defer these proofs to
the appendix (Section 5), and opt to explain their meaning as intuitively and pre-
formally as possible in terms of probability, evidence, and conjecture. One feature
of the constructive logic of MLTT is its amenability to formalization in a computer-
based proof assistant, such as Coq or UniMath. Some parts of the formal system
introduced here have been formalized in UniMath, and it is left as a topic of future
work to fully formalize this theory. Though I attempt to provide as much explanation
about type theory as possible, for brevity I assume basic knowledge of the rules and
syntax of MLTT. I refer the reader to [Uni13,ML84] for a thorough introduction of
MLTT and homotopy type theory. For more on the philosophy of intuitionism, see
Brouwer [Brob, Broa, Bro81], Heyting [Hey71], Dummett [Dum00], and Martin-Löf
[ML87,ML96].
2. Type theoretic probability
At a conceptual level, the state of affairs decomposes statements about truth and
probability into five main components:
• Judgment: A judgment is an assertion, based on context and witnessed by
either proof or evidence, that a concept is true or probable.
• Context: Judgments about truth and probability depend on context.
• Concept: Judgments are made about concepts. Following Martin-Löf’s mean-
ing explanation, the meaning of a concept is determined by how the concept
manifests itself.
• Proof: The truth of any concept manifests itself in proof.
• Evidence: A conjecture about a concept manifests itself in evidence.
4Contrast this with the orthodox Bayesian approach to evidence, which takes the probability function
Pr(·) as primitive and defines E as evidence for A just in case Pr(A | E) > Pr(A), where Pr(A | E)
is the conditional probability of A given E. From this perspective, the probabilities determined by
Pr(·) exist prior to and independently of judgments about evidence. In the perspective taken here,
evidence is primitive: a judgment about the ‘probability of A’ cannot be made without evidence
that supports the judgment. I explore this contrast further in [Cra18].
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Here I write ‘concept’ instead of ‘proposition’ to suggest the more general settings
(e.g., law, science) in which this thinking applies. The interpretation of types as
mathematical concepts has also been suggested in [LP14]. To emphasize this inter-
pretation below, I write A : Concept in place of A : Type, without any change to
the rules of MLTT.
These main components are expressed formally in MLTT with the following nota-
tion.
pre-formal formal (MLTT)
Context Γ
A is a concept A : Concept
‘A is probable’ is a concept Prob(A) : Concept
judgment that A is true a : A
conjecture that A is true a : Prob(A)
In particular, if A : Concept is a mathematical proposition, then a : A is interpreted
as ‘a is a proof of A’ and a : Prob(A) as ‘a is evidence for A’. I call any judgment
‘a : A’ a truth statement and ‘a : Prob(A)’ a conjecture.
The above setup is formalized in the following syntax, with the left of the turnstile
providing context for the judgments on the right, written ‘Context ` Judgment’.
Formal: Γ ` A : Concept
Semi-formal: Context ` A is a concept
Interpretation: Context invokes the concept A.
Example: The context of arithmetic invokes the concept that addition
is commutative: for all n,m : N, n+m = m+ n.
Formal: Γ, A : Concept ` Prob(A) : Concept
Semi-formal: Context, A is a concept ` ‘A is probable’ is a concept
Interpretation: The context along with the concept A invokes the concept
of the probability of A.
Example: The context of arithmetic and the concept that every even
integer greater than 4 is the sum of two odd primes invokes
the concept that such a claim is probable.
Formal: Γ, A : Concept ` a : A
Semi-formal: Context, A is a concept ` a is a proof of A
Interpretation: A judgment from context and a concept A that the truth
of A is witnessed by proof a.
Example: A proof from the rules of arithmetic that addition is
commutative.
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Formal: Γ, A : Concept ` a : Prob(A)
Semi-formal: Context, A is a concept ` a is evidence for A
Interpretation: A judgment from context and a concept A that a
conjecture in A is supported by evidence a.
Example: Empirical evidence that each of 6, . . . , 198, 200 can be
expressed as the sum of two odd primes supports Goldbach’s
conjecture.
The interpretation of Prob(A) as a body of evidence which supports conjectures
about A follows by introducing appropriate rules for the probability type.
2.1. The Probability Type. Reasoning about concepts in MLTT proceeds by ap-
plying rules of formation, introduction, elimination, and computation associated to
each type. For lack of space, I refer the reader to the appendix of [KL11] and also
[Uni13, Appendix A.2] and [ML84, LP14] for a list of the standard rules of MLTT.
See Table 1 for a comparison between the syntax of MLTT and classical logic. Note
well the distinction between the constructive, proof relevant syntax of MLTT and the
non-constructive, truth functional syntax of classical logic. For example, the type∑
a:AB(a) in MLTT and ∃aB(a) in classical logic can both be read as ‘there exists a
such that B(a)’, but their interpretations differ: in MLTT this statement requires an
explicit witness 〈a, b〉 for a : A and b : B(a), and any subsequent outcomes derived
from 〈a, b〉 : ∑a:AB(a) are formally obtained by manipulating 〈a, b〉 according to the
rules of MLTT. In classical logic, on the other hand, the ‘truth’ of ∃aB(a) is sufficient
for deriving further conclusions, without regard for the proof that establishes this
claim.
The syntax of MLTT aligns the intuitionistic conceptions of truth and probability
through the analogy
(1) proof : truth :: evidence : probability.
Whereas the lefthand side of (1) is fulfilled by judgments of the form a : A (in Martin-
Löf’s meaning explanation), the righthand side is filled out by the following rules for
the probability type.
Formation rule:
(2)
Γ ` A : Concept
Γ ` Prob(A) : Concept (Prob-form)
Semi-formal: Associated to any concept A, whose meaning is determined by proofs
that A is true, is a concept Prob(A), whose meaning is determined
by evidence that A is true.
Example: From the concept of ‘it is raining’, derive the concept that ‘it is
probably raining’.
Introduction rule:
(3)
Γ ` A : Concept
Γ, a : A ` evidA(a) : Prob(A) (Prob-intro)
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Type theory Interpretation (Curry–Howard) Classical logic Interpretation
A : Type A is a proposition A proposition
a : A a is a proof of A ` A A is true
A×B A and B A ∧B A true and B true
A+B A or B (disjoint union) A ∨B A true or B true
A→ B A implies B ¬A ∨B if A then B∑
a:AB(a) there exists a : A s.t. B(a) ∃a B(a) there exists a s.t. B(a)∏
a:AB(a) B(a) for every a : A ∀a B(a) B(a) true for all a
0 empty type (contradiction) ⊥ false/contradiction
A→ 0 A is false ¬A not A
a =A a′ proofs that a and a′ are identical
Table 1. Comparison between syntax of MLTT and classical logic.
Note that the constructive nature of MLTT means that a proof of ‘B(a)
for all a : A’ requires an explicit term f : ∏a:AB(a) that associates a
witness f(a) : B(a) to every a : A. Similarly, a proof that ‘there exists
a : A such that B(a)’ requires a witness a : A along with b(a) : B(a) so
that 〈a, b(a)〉 : ∑a:AB(a). The (propositional) identity type a =A a′,
which consists of all proofs that a and a′ are identical terms of A, has
no analog in classical logic.
Semi-formal: Proof is the definitive and strongest kind of evidence: any proof
of A (i.e., a : A) determines evidence for A (i.e., evidA(a) : Prob(A)).
Example: From definitive proof that ‘it is raining’ (e.g., seeing rain through the
window), deduce the weaker statement that ‘it is probably raining’.
Elimination rule 1 (Rule of implication):
(4)
Γ ` A : Concept
Γ, x : Prob(A) ` C(x) : Concept
Γ, a : A ` d(a) : C(evidA(a))
Γ, x : Prob(A) ` impd(x) : Prob(C(x))
(Prob-elim-1)
Semi-formal: Reasoning about evidence is guided by reasoning about proof. Thus,
if A implies C, then evidence for A implies evidence for C.
Example: Since ‘it is raining’ implies that ‘the roads are wet’, evidence that ‘it
is raining’ supports the conjecture that ‘the roads are probably wet’.
Elimination rule 2 (Rule of inference):
(5)
Γ ` A : Concept
Γ, x : Prob(A) ` C(x) : Concept
Γ, a : A ` d(evidA(a)) : C(evidA(a))
Γ, x : Prob(A) ` infd(x) : C(x) (Prob-elim-2)
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Semi-formal: If A implies C but only through the evidence induced by proofs of
A, then evidence of A implies C.
Example: ‘It is snowing’ implies that ‘it is cold outside’, but only through
the evidence required to determine that there is evidence for
‘it is probably snowing’. Thus, from the judgment ‘it is probably
snowing’ we can deduce that ‘it is cold outside’.
Computation rule 1:
(6)
Γ ` A : Concept
Γ, x : Prob(A) ` C(x) : Concept
Γ, a : A ` d(a) : C(evidA(a))
Γ, a : A ` impd(evidA(a)) ≡ evidC(evid(a))(d(a)) : Prob(C(evidA(a)))
(Prob-comp-1)
Semi-formal: The computation rule combines (3) and (4) to make impd defined
in (4) compatible with its constructor d.
Computation rule 2:
(7)
Γ ` A : Concept
Γ, x : Prob(A) ` C(x) : Concept
Γ, a : A ` d(evidA(a)) : C(evidA(a))
Γ, a : A ` infd(evidA(a)) ≡ d(evidA(a)) : C(evidA(a)) (Prob-comp-2)
Semi-formal: The computation rule combines (3) and (5) to make infd defined
in (5) compatible with its constructor d.
0-rule:
(8) Γ ` Prob(0) = 0 : Concept (Prob-0)
Semi-formal: Since 0 : Concept is the concept of emptiness, i.e., has no terms,
Prob(0) is the body of evidence supporting the claim ‘0 is
inhabited’. But since 0 is uninhabited by definition, any evidence
for 0 would immediately lead to contradication; thus, Prob(0) is
also uninhabited.
Additional elimination rules could be introduced to reflect other ways to reason
with evidence, e.g., a relation for judging relative strength of evidence (see Section
2.6). To streamline the discussion here, I restrict attention to the fragment described
by the rules above.
These rules complete the righthand side of the analogy in (1), warranting the
interpretation
a : A :: evidA(a) : Prob(A)
proof : truth :: evidence : probability.
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The next few sections establish some formal consequences of these rules which make
precise the pre-formal interpretation of Prob(A) as a body of evidence and the judg-
ments of the form a : Prob(A) as conjectures about the truth of A. To help the
exposition, I defer formal proof of these results to Section 5.
2.2. Carriers of probability. By the introduction rule (3), evidence can be de-
rived from any proof, and thus to every a : A there corresponds a piece of evidence
evidA(a) : Prob(A). But because judgments about probability are conjectural, the
interpretation of the probability type in terms of evidence is viable only if the logic
permits the judgment a : Prob(A) to be made without definitive proof of A. In other
words, the formal calculus should be consistent with but should not require
(9)
∏
a:Prob(A)
∑
x:A
(evidA(x) =Prob(A) a).
To every piece of evidence for A (i.e., a : Prob(A)) there exists a
proof of A (i.e., x : A) that is compatible with that evidence (i.e.,
p : evidA(x) = a).
If, for example, (9) were required to hold, then any conjecture a : Prob(A) would
have to correspond to a proof, thus defeating the purpose of the established formalism
as a logic for handling evidence. But while it is possible that a conjecture a : Prob(A)
may be valid without any x : A for which evidA(x) = a, the formalism is consistent
with this stringent correspondence between Prob(A) and A:
(10)
∏
a:Prob(A)
((∑
x:A
(evidA(x) =Prob(A) a)→ 0
)
→ 0
)
.
It cannot be ruled out that every conjecture (i.e., a : Prob(A)) corre-
sponds to a proof (i.e., x : A) through evidA : A→ Prob(A).
According to (10), the logic is compatible with judgments of someone who refuses to
conjecture without having definite proof.
The observation in (10) goes hand in hand with the intended interpretation of the
inhabitants of Prob(A) as carriers of evidence. For if∑
x:A
(evidA(x) =Prob(A) a)→ 0
were consistent for some A and a : Prob(A), then the interpretation of a as evidence
for A would be called into question. Since∑
x:A
(evidA(x) =Prob(A) a)→ 0
rules out that a corresponds to some proof of A, the interpretation of a as evidence
supporting the conjecture that A is provable becomes obscured. So even though the
logic is consistent with probability judgments which do not necessarily correspond
to a direct proof, in order for a probability judgment (a : Prob(A)) to qualify as a
credible statement about ‘evidence in favor of A’, bona fide evidence a : Prob(A)
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must at least suggest that a corresponds to a proof of A:
(11)
∏
a:Prob(A)
Prob
(∑
x:A
(evidA(x) =Prob(A) a)
)
.
Any piece of evidence for A (i.e., a : Prob(A)) gives rise to evidence
that there exists a proof of A (i.e., x : A) that is compatible with that
evidence (i.e., p : evidA(x) = a).
2.3. Structure of probability. The structure of probability induced by the formal
rules (2)-(8) can be summarized neatly for free-standing concepts (i.e., non-dependent
types). Suppose A,B : Concept is such that B is provable whenever A is, i.e., A→ B
is inhabited. Informally, since the truth of A implies the truth of B (i.e., A → B)
and evidence for A hints at the truth of A, then evidence for A should also hint at
the truth of B. Formally, this follows by applying the elimination rule (4) to any
f : A → B. In particular, define C ≡ λa.B : A → Concept in (4)5 so that for any
f : A→ B and any context Γ one can derive6
Γ, a : A ` f(a) : C(a) ≡ B.
Then by (4) and (6), we have impf : Prob(A)→ Prob(B) such that impf (evidA(a)) ≡
evidB(f(a)). When combined with (5) and (7), we obtain the following commutative
diagram for A,B,C : Concept.
(12)
A B C
Prob(A) Prob(B) Prob(C)
f
d ◦ evidA
evidA
g ◦ f
g
evidB
e ◦ evidB
evidC
impf
infd
impg ◦ impf = impg◦f
impg
infe
5Here I have used λ-abstraction to define the function C : A → Concept which assigns each a to
B. In general the notation λx.y : X → Y is a function that assigns each x : X to some y : Y .
6Given a : A and f : A→ B, we can apply f to a to obtain f(a) : B.
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impf ◦ evidA ≡ evidB ◦ f : A→ Prob(B)
infd ◦ evidA ≡ d ◦ evidA : A→ B
impd◦evidA = impinfd◦evidA = infevidB◦infd(13)
impe◦evidB = impinfe◦evidB = infevidC◦infe .(14)
Note that for general expressions x and x′ of type A, I write x ≡ x′ : A to denote
judgmental equality and x =A x′ to denote propositional identity in MLTT. Proposi-
tional identity x =A x′ is shorthand for the type Id(x, x′, A) in MLTT, whose terms
are proofs that x and x′ are identical. When the type is clear from context, I often
omit it, writing x = x′ for propositional identity.
2.4. Combining evidence. The rules of MLTT together with the rules for the prob-
ability type induce a logic for combining evidence of different assertions and deriving
new conjectures from old. For example, as carriers of evidence for ‘A and B’, the
terms of Prob(A× B) ought to give rise to evidence for A and evidence for B indi-
vidually. That is, when considering the conjecture x : Prob(A × B) for ‘A and B’,
one can disregard the relevance of x to B (respectively, A) and derive a conjecture
for A (resp. B) on its own:
(15) splitprobA,B : Prob(A×B)→ Prob(A)×Prob(B).
Evidence for ‘A and B’ can be split into separate pieces of evidence for
A and B individually.
Similarly, when in possession of evidence for A or evidence for B, one can derive
evidence for ‘A or B’:
(16) combprobA,B : Prob(A) +Prob(B)→ Prob(A+B).
Evidence for ‘A or B’ can be derived from evidence for A or evidence
for B.
Together (15) and (16) give the hierarchy
(17) Prob(A×B)→ Prob(A)×Prob(B)→ Prob(A)+Prob(B)→ Prob(A+B).
The implications in (17) do not, in general, go in reverse. One may not, for example,
feel compelled to combine two pieces of evidence, one for A and one for B, into a single
conjecture for A and B jointly, as it might not be clear whether the specific pieces of
evidence, say, a : Prob(A) and b : Prob(B), are compatible as evidence for ‘A and B’.
Similarly, having evidence for ‘A or B’ need not be sufficient for deriving evidence for
either of the two individually. Indeed, for a given proposition A, one might postulate
the law of excluded middle LEMA : A + ¬A without specifying which of A or ¬A
holds. Asserting LEMA allows the derivation evidA+¬A(LEMA) : Prob(A+¬A) by (3),
but without further evidence as to which of A or ¬A holds the logical calculus does
not justify a conjecture in A or ¬A individually. These observations illustrate the
‘proof relevant’ character of MLTT: e.g., to conjecture ‘A and B’, it is not enough to
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simply have evidence for A and evidence for B; the two pieces of evidence must also
be compatible with one another.
The relations shown in (12), (15), and (16) for non-dependent types A and B
extend to relations about universal and existential statements for dependent types
B : A→ Concept.
(18) Prob(
∏
a:A
B(a))→∏
a:A
Prob(B(a)).
From evidence that B holds for every proof of A, derive evidence of
B(a) from any particular proof a : A.
(19)
∑
a:A
Prob(B(a))→ Prob(∑
a:A
B(a)).
From any proof of A (i.e., a : A) for which there is evidence for B
(i.e., b : Prob(B(a))), derive evidence that B holds for some proof of
A (i.e., Prob(∑a:AB(a))).
2.5. Logic for handling evidence. The opening discussion of Section 1 raises the
question of how a conjecture for B can be justified from (i) a conjecture for A and
(ii) proof of A→ B. In our formalism, this corresponds to exhibiting a term of type
Prob(A)× (A→ B)→ Prob(B),
which we have already shown through the commutative diagram in (12). Other
similar inference rules for the probability type can be derived from the rules (2)-(8)
by noting the distinction between A → B in MLTT and classical logic. In classical
logic, A→ B is defined as the material conditional ¬A∨B, read as ‘if A then B’. By
the law of excluded middle this is equivalent to ¬¬(¬A ∨ B) ≡ ¬(A ∧ ¬B), yielding
logical equivalence among the statements
¬A ∨B ≡ A→ B ≡ ¬(A ∧ ¬B).
But in the constructive logic of MLTT, the above three statements have different
meanings and are related by the hierarchy
(20) (¬A+B)→ (A→ B)→ ¬(A× ¬B),
which in turn elicits a corresponding hierarchy among the corresponding probability
statements; see (27).
2.5.1. Evidence under ¬A+ B. Working from left to right in (20), assume first that
there is evidence for A and proof of ‘B or not A’ (i.e., ¬A + B). By the elimination
rule for the coproduct type ¬A + B, we reason by case analysis. If B is already
known, then B can trivially be derived, regardless of the evidence for A. And by the
implication rule (4) and 0-rule (8), ¬A ≡ A → 0 implies Prob(A) → 0, meaning
that the evidence for A can be used to derive a contradiction, from which anything
follows. Together this gives an inhabitant of
(21) Prob(A)× (¬A+B)→ B.
From a conjecture in A and proof of ‘B or not A’, derive a proof of B.
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Notice as a special case that taking B ≡ A in (21) gives Prob(A)× (A+ ¬A)→ A,
so that, in particular, evidence for A and LEMA : A + ¬A is enough to construct
a proof of A. Thus, from evidence of A one can derive truth of A deductively by
postulating LEMA : A+¬A. Though this seems counterintuitive at first, it is clarified
by considering the meaning of the judgment LEMA : A+¬A in the logic of MLTT. (In
MLTT, LEMA : A+¬A is a ‘proof’ that ‘A or ¬A’ holds. By the introduction rule for
coproducts, such a proof corresponds either to a proof of A or a proof of ¬A. If the
former, then A is true. If the latter, then the evidence for A contradicts the proof of
‘not A’, and from a contradiction anything follows.)
On the other hand, from proof of A and a conjecture ‘B or not A, one derives
evidence for B:
(22) A×Prob(¬A+B)→ Prob(B).
2.5.2. Evidence under A→ B. The structure of evidence summarized in (12) implies
that evidence for B can be derived from evidence for A and proof that ‘A implies B’,
i.e., from a : Prob(A) and f : A → B derive impf (a) : Prob(B). In fact, this can
be done so that the evidence for A is compatible with the derived evidence for B,
justifying a conjecture in ‘A and B’ jointly:
Prob(A)× (A→ B)→ Prob(A×B)(23)
Given evidence for A and proof that ‘A implies B’, conjecture ‘A and
B’.
Also by (4), any verification of A and evidence that ‘A implies B’ combine into
evidence for ‘A and B’:
(24) A×Prob(A→ B)→ Prob(A×B).
2.5.3. Evidence under ¬(A× ¬B). When equipped with proof that ‘A and not B is
not the case’ (i.e., ¬(A×¬B)), evidence for A must suggest that ¬B is not the case
(i.e., ¬¬B) since the evidence for A hints that A is true while the proof of ¬(A×¬B)
implies that A and ¬B cannot both be true:
(25) Prob(A)× ¬(A× ¬B)→ Prob(A× ¬¬B).
Evidence for A and proof of ¬(A × ¬B) combine to give evidence for
A× ¬¬B.
(Recall that, in general, ¬¬B and B are not identical in MLTT, because MLTT does
not require the law of excluded middle.)
Similarly, from proof of A and evidence for ¬(A×¬B), one can derive evidence for
¬¬B since knowing A and having evidence that A and ¬B cannot both hold gives
evidence against ¬B:
(26) A×Prob(¬(A× ¬B))→ Prob(A× ¬¬B).
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Comparing the statements in (21), (23), and (25) and ignoring the appearance of
A in their conclusion7 gives the following commutative diagram, which agrees with
the hierarchy in (20).
(27)
¬A+B Prob(A)× (¬A+B) B
A→ B Prob(A)× (A→ B) Prob(B)
¬(A× ¬B) Prob(A)× ¬(A× ¬B) Prob(¬¬B)
2.6. Grades of evidence. We have so far discussed the probability type as a way
of representing evidence ‘at level one’, i.e., evidence of a proposition. Unlike the con-
ventional numerical approach to probability as a measure of evidence, the formalism
presented here provides no immediate way to compare different pieces of evidence in
terms of which is ‘stronger’. In the same way that different proofs of A cannot be
compared on the basis of which better establishes the truth of A—both establish the
truth of A, but in (possibly) different ways—there is no aspect of the formal system
which allows for one to judge, for example, that a : Prob(A) is ‘stronger evidence’
for A than a′ : Prob(A), or that a makes A ‘more probable’ than a′ does.
There are two possible ways to incorporate such a notion of evidential strength
into this formalism. One is to extend upon the rules (2)-(8) by adding a relation
≤A: Prob(A) × Prob(A) → Bool for each A : Concept along with rules for ≤A
that agree with the interpretation of ≤A (a, a′) as ‘a′ is stronger evidence for A than a’.
A second possibility requires no additional rules, but instead follows by iterating the
probability type constructor Prob : Concept → Concept to obtain an inductive
hierarchy of different ‘grades of evidence’, beginning with truth (A), then evidence
of truth (Prob(A)), evidence of evidence (Prob(Prob(A))), evidence of evidence of
evidence (Prob(Prob(Prob(A)))), and so on. For each A : Concept, the formalism
captures these different grades of evidence by the inductive definition
Probn(A) : Concept
Prob0(A) :≡ A
Probn+1(A) :≡ Prob(Probn(A)),
so that Probn(A) consists of the nth level evidence of A. The theorems expressed
throughout Section 2.5 can be extended to these ‘higher probability types’ in a
7For example, from the conclusion Prob(A × ¬¬B) in (26), we can apply (15) to get
splitprobA,¬¬B : Prob(A×¬¬B)→ Prob(A)×Prob(¬¬B), which we compose with the projec-
tion map pr¬¬B : Prob(A)×Prob(¬¬B)→ Prob(¬¬B), 〈x, y〉 7→ y, to obtain Prob(¬¬B).
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straightforward way. For example, for m,n ≥ 0, we can extend (23) to
Probm(A)×Probn(A→ B)→ Probm+n(B).
Both of these possible extensions are interesting for future examination, but are not
discussed here due to space limitations; see [Cra18] for further discussion.
3. Homotopy Probability Theory
So far the logic of probability described above has been purely syntactic, expressed
as a logic for reasoning about concepts in MLTT. Though Martin-Löf’s meaning
explanation provides an interpretation of this syntax in terms of proofs and evidence
for propositions, we can gain additional insights by interpreting the syntax of MLTT
into homotopy type theory (HoTT). In HoTT, the types in MLTT are interpreted
as homotopy types (i.e., topological spaces up to homotopy equivalence), and the
calculus is empowered by the resulting univalence axiom, by which two types A,B :
Concept are regarded as identical (i.e., A =Concept B) if their associated homotopy
types are homotopy equivalent.
To emphasize the interpretation in HoTT with univalence, we write A : U (instead
of A : Concept) to indicate that A is a homotopy type in a univalent universe U (i.e.,
a universe of types for which the univalence axiom holds). With A ' B denoting that
A,B : U are homotopy equivalent8 and A=U B signifying that A and B are identical
as homotopy types in U, the univalence axiom states, roughly, that for all A,B : U
(A ' B) ' (A=U B)(28)
equivalence is equivalent to identity.
Formally, this is accomplished by constructing the canonical map stating that identity
implies equivalence,
idtoequivA,B : (A=U B)→ (A ' B),
and asserting as an axiom,
ua :
∏
A,B:U
isequiv(idtoequivA,B),
so that idtoequivA,B is an equivalence between A and B for all A,B : U.9
The univalence axiom is a powerful and intriguing proposal in Voevovdsky’s Uni-
valent Foundations program [APW13, PW12,Uni13]. As it is impossible to discuss
the many interesting aspects of HoTT and univalence in this short presentation, I
8A ' B is formally defined as the type ∑f :A→B isequiv(f), where
isequiv(f) :≡
 ∑
g:B→A
f ◦ g ∼ idB
×( ∑
h:B→A
h ◦ f ∼ idA
)
,
for idC ≡ λc.c : C → C for any C : U.
9Following the convention of [Uni13], I write ua(p) : A=U B to indicate the image of p : A ' B
under ua.
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provide here only a cursory overview of how the familiar probabilistic concepts of in-
dependence, conditional probability, and additivity can be conceived in the proposed
type theoretic version of probability. I refer the reader to [Awo14, Awo16, APW13,
Tse16,Tse17,Shu17,Uni13] for further details about HoTT.
3.1. Identical concepts have identical probabilities. It is intuitive that identical
concepts ought to have identical probabilities, as can be proven using the induction
rule for identity types in MLTT without appealing to univalence: for all A,B :
Concept and a, a′ : A,
(a =A a′)→ (evidA(a) =Prob(A) evidA(a′))(29)
(A =Concept B)→ (Prob(A) =Concept Prob(B)).(30)
In MLTT, however, there is no mechanism for proving, e.g., A×B =Concept B×A. (In
MLTT, we can only prove that A×B and B×A are isomorphic, i.e., A×B ' B×A,
but we need the univalence axiom to derive A×B=U B×A from this isomorphism.)
With the univalence axiom, we have, for all A,B : U,
(31) (A ' B)→ (Prob(A) ' Prob(B)),
from which several obvious statements follow as corollaries, including
Prob(A×B) ' Prob(B × A) and
Prob(A+B) ' Prob(B + A).
The univalence axiom has additional consequences for more nuanced aspects of the
probability type, such as conditional probability, independence, and additivity, which
warrant a much more in depth discussion than the brief introduction below.
3.2. Conditional probability. In practice, it is common to form a judgment, such
as ‘A and B’ is probable, by combining new evidence for B with old evidence for
A. Formally, we define the conditional probability of B given a : Prob(A) as the
dependent type Prob(B | −) : Prob(A)→ Concept given for each a : Prob(A) by
(32) Prob(B | a) :≡ ∑
x:Prob(A×B)
(impprA(x) =Prob(A) a).
Conditional evidence for B given evidence for A (i.e., a : Prob(A))
consists of evidence for ‘A and B’ (i.e., x : Prob(A×B)) along with
proof that x is compatible with a (i.e., p : impprA(x) = a).
In (32), prA : A × B → A, 〈a, b〉 7→ a, is the canonical projection map and impprA :
Prob(A×B)→ Prob(A) is the map constructed by applying the implication rule (4)
to prA. According to (32), the inhabitants of Prob(B | a) correspond to ‘conditional
conjectures’, i.e., a conjecture in B that is conditional on the conjecture a : Prob(A).
Such a conjecture can be asserted just in case there is evidence x : Prob(A×B) for
A and B along with proof that x is compatible with a. A conditional conjecture in B
given a : Prob(A) is thus stronger than a conjecture in ‘A and B’ alone because the
conditional probability requires that x : Prob(A × B) is compatible with a specific
conjecture a : Prob(A). This may at first seem counterintuitive since it appears
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that the previous evidence for A has already done “half the work” in establishing
the conjecture in ‘A and B’. But, at the same time, a : Prob(A) constrains what
can serve as evidence for the conditional conjecture in B, because the conditional
conjecture is required to be compatible with a : Prob(A).
By analogy to the classical law of total probability in the probability calculus,10
we observe a similar equivalence between Prob(A × B) and the total space of all
conditional probabilities Prob(B | a) over all a : Prob(A),
(33) Prob(A×B) ' ∑
a:Prob(A)
Prob(B | a).
Having evidence for ‘A and B’ is equivalent to having a piece of evi-
dence for A (i.e., a : Prob(A)) along with conditional evidence for B
that is compatible with a.
For any A,B : U, the equivalence (33) is established by the conditionalization map
condB|A : Prob(A×B)→
∑
a:Prob(A)
Prob(B | a)
condB|A(x) :≡ 〈impprA(x), 〈x, reflimpprA (x)〉〉,(34)
which decomposes evidence x : Prob(A × B) for A and B into evidence for A
(i.e., impprA(x) : Prob(A)) and conditional evidence for B given impprA(x) (i.e.,〈x, reflimpprA (x)〉 : Prob(B | impprA(x))). I prove (33) in Section 5.
3.3. Independence. Two concepts can be regarded as independent whenever their
associated ‘bodies of evidence’ are unrelated to one another. In other words, two
assertions are independent if a conjecture about one is irrelevant to a conjecture
about the other, expressed formally as
(35) Prob(A×B) =Concept Prob(A)×Prob(B).
Evidence for A (resp. B) serves neither to corroborate nor refute evi-
dence for B (resp. A).
I note in passing the similarity between (35) and the definition of independence in the
ordinary probability calculus, Pr(A ∧ B) = Pr(A) × Pr(B), with A and B regarded
as propositions and ‘×’ interpreted as multiplication.
Under univalence, with concepts interpreted as spaces in a universe U, (35) is
equivalent to
(36) Prob(A×B) ' Prob(A)×Prob(B),
which must be witnessed by a homotopy equivalence between Prob(A × B) and
Prob(A)×Prob(B). From Section 2.4, there is a canonical mapping
splitprobA,B : Prob(A×B)→ Prob(A)×Prob(B)
10In the standard (numerical) probability calculus, the law of total probability states that Pr(A ∧
B) =
∑k
j=1 Pr(B | Aj)Pr(Aj) for any propositions A,B and a partition of A into mutually exclusive
propositions A ≡ A1 ∨ · · · ∨Ak.
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as defined in (15), but there is no canonical mapping Prob(A) × Prob(B) →
Prob(A×B). By understanding independence to mean that evidence for A is irrel-
evant to evidence for B, and vice versa, we define the independence type of A and B
by
(37) indep(A,B) :≡ isequiv(splitprobA,B).
3.4. Conditional independence. Combining the definitions in Sections 3.2 and
3.3, we define conditional independence by replacing the probabilities in (35) with
conditional probabilities: for A,B : Concept, we say that A and B are conditionally
independent given C : Concept if∏
c:Prob(C)
(Prob(A×B | c) =Concept Prob(A | c)×Prob(B | c)).
Interpreting MLTT into HoTT, we formally define the conditional independence type
of A and B given C by
indep(A,B | C) :≡ ∏
c:Prob(C)
isequiv(condsplitA,B|C(c)),
for
condsplitA,B|C :
∏
c:Prob(C)
Prob(A×B | c)→ Prob(A | c)×Prob(B | c)
condsplitA,B|C :≡
≡ λc.λ〈x, p〉.〈〈impprA(x), compprC ,prA×C • p〉, 〈impprB(x), compprC ,prB×C • p〉〉,
where, for general f : A→ B and g : B → C,
compg,f : impg ◦ impf = impg◦f
is the proof of the propositional identity for composition reflected in (12), and for
general x, y, z : X, r • s : x = z is the concatenation of the paths determined by
r : x = y, and s : y = z in the homotopic interpretation.
3.5. Additivity. I conclude with a brief discussion of additivity, which figures promi-
nently in the axioms of conventional probability theory but whose analog is absent
from the evidence-based theory presented above. In the ordinary quantitative theory
of probability, the additivity axiom says that
(38) Pr(A ∨B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B)
for any mutually exclusive propositions A and B. If these probabilities are interpreted
as a measure of the amount of evidence supporting ‘A and B’, then (38) says that
the amount of evidence supporting ‘A or B’ equals the amount supporting A plus the
amount supporting B. In the type theoretic (‘proof relevant’) setting, with Prob(A)
and Prob(B) interpreted as the bodies of evidence supporting A and B, respectively,
we express the analog to (38) as
(39) Prob(A+B) =Concept Prob(A) +Prob(B),
18 HARRY CRANE
with + interpreted now as the coproduct in type theory. In (39), the lefthand side is
the body of evidence for ‘A or B’ while the righthand side is the disjoint union of the
body of evidence for A and the body of evidence for B. The discussion in Section 2.4
showed that evidence for A or evidence for B gives evidence for ‘A or B’, i.e.,
(40) combprobA,B : Prob(A) +Prob(B)→ Prob(A+B),
but in general having evidence for A or B is not enough to determine which of the
two there is evidence for.
These observations provide a link between our conception of probability as a body
of evidence and the Dempster–Shafer axioms of belief functions Bel(·) [Dem67,Sha76],
which instead of (38) require the weaker condition
(41) Bel(A ∨B) ≥ Bel(A) + Bel(B).
The inequality in (41) reflects the possibility that the amount of evidence favoring
A∨B might strictly exceed the sum of evidence for A and B individually. Note that,
by interpreting ‘→’ as ‘≤’ when evidence is regarded as a quantity, the implication
in (40) agrees with the inequality in (41). The theory of evidence presented here
is thus consistent with the Shaferian mathematical theory of evidence [Sha76]. It
is interesting to consider the implications of assuming the additivity condition (39)
when interpreted in HoTT. In this case, (39) becomes
Prob(A+B) ' Prob(A) +Prob(B),
and one could postulate (perhaps as an axiom) that the canonical map combprobA,B
in (40) is an equivalence,
isequiv(combprobA,B).
But this is beyond the scope of our discussion here.
4. Concluding remarks
I have proposed a type-theoretic formalization of probability in which probability
statements are defined as primitive judgments about evidence. As the concepts of
probability and evidence have been intermingled for millenia, cf. [GZP+89, Fra15],
the formalism presented here is perhaps more historically accurate than the current
mathematical orthodoxy for probability. Indeed, it was not until relatively recently
in history that probability took its present numerical form [Por96,Hac75]. Also, since
judgments of the form ‘a is evidence for A’ arise much more commonly and naturally
than precise quantitative probability assignments (i.e., degrees of belief), this frame-
work is arguably better for modeling the way in which people routinely reason with
evidence in legal proceedings, scientific investigation, mathematical conjecture, and
everyday decision making. Finally, I have posed mathematical conjecture as the back-
drop in order to anchor the exposition in something concrete without delving too far
into the details of the given application. I discuss many more historical, philosophical,
and conceptual aspects of this work in [Cra18].
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5. Appendix: Technical Proofs
Proof of (11). We apply the elimination rule (4) to construct a witness
λa.impd(a) :
∏
a:Prob(A)
Prob(C(a)),
for the type family
C : Prob(A)→ Concept
C(a) :≡∑
x:A
(impprA(x) =Prob(A) a)
and d : ∏x:AC(evidA(x)) defined by
(42) d(x) :≡ 〈x, reflevidA(x)〉 :
∑
x:A
(evidA(x) =Prob(A) evidA(x)).

Proof of (10). Given a : Prob(A) and f : ∑x:A(evidA(x) =Prob(A) a) → 0, we can
derive f(y) : 0 for each y : ∑x:A(evidA(x) =Prob(A) a). By the implication rule (4),
we immediately have
impf : Prob
(∑
x:A
(evidA(x) =Prob(A) a)
)
→ Prob(0) ≡ 0
impf (evid(y)) :≡ evid0(f(y)), y :
∑
x:A
(evidA(x) =Prob(A) a).
Finally, let d be as defined in (42), so that by (11), we have
λa.impd(a) :
∏
a:Prob(A)
Prob
(∑
x:A
(evidA(x) =Prob(A) a)
)
.
We conclude by constructing
λa.λf.impf (impd(a)) :
∏
a:Prob(A)
(
∑
x:A
(evidA(x) =Prob(A) a)→ 0)→ 0 .

Proof of (12), (13), and (14). Several of the commutativity relations in (12) follow
directly from the rules (2)-(8) of the probability type. For example, by (4) and (6),
we immediately have
impf ◦ evidA ≡ evidB ◦ f : A→ Prob(B) and
infd ◦ evidA ≡ d ◦ evidA : A→ B,
and analogously for g : B → C and e◦evidB : B → C in (12). By the first judgmental
equality, we thus have compg,f : impg ◦ impf = impg◦f by first proving
(43) proda:Prob(A)(impg◦f (a) =Prob(C) (impg ◦ impf )(a))
and then applying the axiom of function extensionality. To prove (43), we apply the
second elimination and computation rules of the probability type ((5) and (7)) as
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follows. First define
C : Prob(A)→ Concept
C(a) :≡ impg◦f (a) =Prob(C) (impg ◦ impf )(a).
For every x : A, we have
impg◦f (evidA(x)) ≡ evidC(g(f(x))) and
(impg ◦ impf )(evidA(x)) ≡ impg(impf (evidA(x))) ≡ impg(evidB(f(x))) ≡ evidC(g(f(x))),
so that
d(evidA(x)) ≡ reflevidC(g(f(x))) : C(evidA(x))
depends on x only through evidA(x). By (5), we have
infd :
∏
a:Prob(A)
C(a),
as desired. Commutativity of the other relations in (12) follow by similar applications
of the eliminations rules for Prob.
To show the first equality in (13), we use both computation rules (6) and (7) with
C : Prob(A)→ Concept
C(a) :≡ impd◦evidA(a) = impinfd◦evidA(a)
as follows. For x : A, we have
impd◦evidA(evidA(x)) ≡ evidB(d(evidA(x))) : A→ Prob(B)
impinfd◦evidA(evidA(x)) ≡ evidB(infd(evidA(x))) ≡ evidB(d(evidA(x))) : A→ Prob(B),
so that
r(evidA(x)) ≡ reflevidB(d(evidA(x))) : C(evidA(x))
and
infr :
∏
a:Prob(A)
impd◦evidA(a) = impinfd◦evidA(a)
by (7). For the second equality, we argue similarly by noting that for every x : A
infevidB◦infd(evidA(x)) ≡ evidB(infd(evidA(x))) ≡ evid(d(evidA(x))) : A→ Prob(B)
by (7).

Proof of (15). For A,B : Concept let
prA : A×B → A
prA(〈a, b〉) :≡ a
and
prB : A×B → B
prB(〈a, b〉) :≡ b
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be the projection maps. By (12) we have
impprA : Prob(A×B)→ Prob(A) and
impprB : Prob(A×B)→ Prob(B),
from which we construct
λx.〈impprA(x), impprB(x)〉 : Prob(A×B)→ Prob(A)×Prob(B).

Proof of (16). For A,B : Concept let inl : A → A + B and inr : B → A + B be
the left and right injections, respectively. By (12) (cf. (4)) we have
impinl : Prob(A)→ Prob(A+B) and
impinr : Prob(B)→ Prob(A+B),
from which we construct
h : Prob(A) +Prob(B)→ Prob(A+B)
h(inl(a)) :≡ impinl(a), a : Prob(A),
h(inr(b)) :≡ impinr(b), b : Prob(B).

Proof of (18). Let B : A → Concept be a dependent type. Fix a : A and define
C : Prob(∏y:AB(y)) → Concept as the non-dependent type C(x) :≡ B(a). We
construct λf.f(a) : ∏y:AB(y)→ B(a) so that the elimination rule (4) implies
λx.impλf.f(a)(x) : Prob(
∏
y:A
B(y))→ Prob(B(a)).
We may thus construct
λx.λa.impλf.f(a)(x) : Prob(
∏
y:A
B(y))→∏
a:A
Prob(B(a)).

Proof of (19). Let B : A → Concept be a dependent type. For each a : A define
Ca : Prob(B(a))→ Concept as the non-dependent type Ca(x) :≡ ∑y:AB(y). From
any b : B(a) we construct 〈a, b〉 : Ca(evidB(a)(b)), so that the implication rule (4)
implies
λx.impλb:B(a).〈a,b〉(x) : Prob(B(a))→ Prob(
∑
y:A
B(y)).
We then define
h :
∑
a:A
Prob(B(a))→ Prob(∑
a:A
B(a))
h(〈a, x〉) :≡ impλb:B(a).〈a,b〉(x).

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Proof of (21). Fix A,B : Concept and note first that from any f : ¬A ≡ A→ 0 the
elimination rule (4) implies impf : Prob(A) → 0. Arguing by case analysis for the
coproduct type, we thus construct
h : Prob(A)× (¬A+B)→ B
h(〈a, inl(f)〉) :≡ efqB(impf (a)), a : Prob(A), f : A→ 0,
h(〈a, inr(b)〉) :≡ b, a : Prob(A), b : B,
where efqB : 0 → B is ex falso quodlibet for B. 
Proof of (22). For A,B : Concept and a : A, we define da : ¬A + B → B by the
elimination rule for ¬A+B:
da(inl(f)) :≡ efqB(f(a)), f : A→ 0,
da(inr(b)) :≡ b, b : B.
By the elimination rule for the probability type (4), we construct impda : Prob(¬A+
B)→ Prob(B), from which we conclude by defining
λa.λx.impda(x) : A×Prob(¬A+B)→ Prob(B).

Proof of (23). For A,B : Concept and f : A→ B, we construct
hf : Prob(A)→ Prob(A×B)
hf (a) :≡ impλx.〈x,f(x)〉:A→(A×B)(a).
We then define
λa.λf.hf (a) : Prob(A)× (A→ B)→ Prob(A×B).

Proof of (24). For A,B : Concept and a : A, we define
da ≡ impλf.〈a,f(a)〉:(A→B)→(A×B) : Prob(A→ B)→ Prob(A×B)
by the elimination rule (4). We then construct
λa.λx.da(x) : A×Prob(A→ B)→ Prob(A×B).

Proof of (25). For A,B : Concept, f : A× (B → 0)→ 0, and a : A, we define
fa :≡ λb.f(a, b) : (B → 0)→ 0 .
Thus, for every a : A we have fa : ¬¬B ≡ (B → 0) → 0 and λa.〈a, fa〉 : A →
(A× ¬¬B). The elimination rule for the probability type (4) gives
impλa.〈a,fa〉 : Prob(A)→ Prob(A× ¬¬B).
From the judgmental equality
A× (B → 0)→ 0 ≡ ¬(A× ¬B),
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we define
λx.λf.impλa.〈a,fa〉(x) : Prob(A)× ¬(A× ¬B)→ Prob(A× ¬¬B).

Proof of (26). For A,B : Concept, a : A, and f : A× (B → 0)→ 0, we define
fa :≡ λb.f(a, b) : (B → 0)→ 0
as in the proof of (25). We then define
da ≡ λf.〈a, fa〉 : ¬(A× ¬B)→ (A× ¬¬B)
so that impda : Prob(¬(A× ¬B))→ Prob(A× ¬¬B). The proof is completed by
λa.λx.impda(x) : A×Prob(¬(A× ¬B))→ Prob(A× ¬¬B).

Proof of (27). The following commutes:
(44)
Prob(A)× (¬A+B) B
Prob(A)× (A→ B) Prob(B)
Prob(A)× ¬(A× ¬B) Prob(¬¬B)
α
β evidB
ζ
γ
δ

Define α, β, γ, δ,  as follows. (For f : A → C and g : B → C, I write indf,g :
A+B → C for the function defined by case analysis.)
λa.αL(a) ≡ λa.λg. efqB(impg(a)) : Prob(A)→ ¬A→ B
λa.αR(a) ≡ λa.λb.b : Prob(A)→ B → B
α ≡ λa.λz.indαL(a),αR(a)(z) : Prob(A)× (¬A+B)→ B
λa.βL(a) ≡ λa.λg.〈a, λx. efqB(g(x))〉 : Prob(A)→ ¬A→ Prob(A)× (A→ B)
λa.βR(a) ≡ λa.λb.〈a, λx.b〉 : Prob(A)→ B → Prob(A)× (A→ B)
β ≡ λa.λz.indβL(a),βR(a)(z) : Prob(A)→ (¬A+B)→ Prob(A)× (A→ B)
γ ≡ λa.λf.〈a, λx.λg.g(f(x))〉 : Prob(A)→ (A→ B)→ Prob(A)× ¬(A× ¬B)
δ ≡ λa.λg.impg(a) : Prob(A)→ (A→ ¬¬B)→ Prob(¬¬B)
 ≡ λb.impλy.λg.g(y):B→¬B→0(b) : Prob(B)→ Prob(¬¬B)
ζ ≡ λa.λf.impf (a) : Prob(A)× (A→ B)→ Prob(B).
We first show that the upper square commutes by repeated application of the
elimination rule for the product, coproduct, and probability types. For the upper
half of the square, evidB ◦ α : Prob(A) × (¬A + B) → Prob(B) is defined by case
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analysis:
(a, inl(g)) 7→ evidB(efqB(impg(a))
(a, inr(b)) 7→ evidB(b).
The lower half ζ ◦ β is also defined by case analysis:
(a, inl(g)) 7→ impλx. efqB(g(x))(a)
(a, inr(b)) 7→ impλx.b(a).
Now, to show that evidB ◦ α = ζ ◦ β, we must produce an inhabitant of
p :
∏
z:Prob(A)×(¬A+B)
(evidB ◦ α)(z) = (ζ ◦ β)(z).
By the elimination rule for product and coproduct types, we can construct such an
inhabitant p by considering z = (a, inl(g)) and z = (a, inr(b)) for a : Prob(A),
g : ¬A, and b : B, and defining
p1 :
∏
a:Prob(A)
∏
g:¬A
(evidB(efqB(impg(a))) = impλx. efqB(g(x))(a))
p2 :
∏
a:Prob(A)
∏
b:B
(impλx.b(a) = evidB(b)).
The conclude evidB ◦ α = ζ ◦ β by the axiom of function extensionality (e.g., Axiom
2.9.3 in [Uni13]). For p1, we appeal to the second elimination rule for the probability
type (the rule of inference (7)) to compute
impλx. efqB(g(x))(evidA(x)) ≡ evidB(efqB(g(x))), x : A.
Now, given g : ¬A, x : A, and a : Prob(A), we have
q(a, g) ≡ efqimpg(a)=g(a)(impg(a)) : impg(a) = g(x).
The proof p1 follows by continuity of functions in type theory:
p1 ≡ λa.λg. apevidB◦efqB(q(a, g)) :
∏
a:Prob(A)
∏
g:¬A
(evidB(efqB(impg(a))) = evidB(efqB(g(x)))),
where apevidB◦efqB(q(a, g)) is the application of evidB ◦ efqB to the path q(a, g), as
defined in Lemma 2.2.1 in [Uni13]. For p2, we observe that impλx.b(a) ≡ evidB(b) so
that
p2 :≡ λa.λb.reflevidB(b).
The conclusion follows by the elimination rules for Prob(A)× (¬A+B) and ¬A+B.
To show that the bottom square commutes, we have to prove that  ◦ ζ = δ ◦ γ
holds in Prob(A)× (A→ B)→ Prob(¬¬B). For the upper half, we have
λa.λf.impλy:B.λg:¬B.g(y):0(impf (a)) : Prob(A)× (A→ B)→ Prob(¬¬B),
which for x : A and f : A→ B satisfies
impλy:B.λg:¬B.g(y):0(impf (evidA(x))) ≡ impλy:B.λg:¬B.g(y):0(evidB(f(x)))
≡ evid¬¬B(λg : ¬B.g(f(x))).
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For the bottom half, we have
(δ ◦ γ)(a, f) ≡ impλx.λg.g(f(x))(a),
which for x : A satisfies
impλx.λg.g(f(x))(evidA(x)) ≡ evid¬¬B(λg : ¬¬B.g(f(x))).
The bottom square commutes by reflexivity. The outside square commutes by path
concatenation and associativity.

Proof of (31). Let p : A ' B and let Prob : U → U be the probability type former.
By the univalence axiom of HoTT we have ua(p) : (A=U B). By [Uni13, Lemma
2.2.1] we have a map
apProb : (A=U B)→ (Prob(A) =U Prob(B)),
which combines with ua(p) : A=U B to give
apProb(ua(p)) : Prob(A) =U Prob(B).
Finally, by idtoequiv : (Prob(A) =U Prob(B)) → (Prob(A) ' Prob(B)), we ob-
tain
λp.idtoequiv(apProb(ua(p))) : (A ' B)→ (Prob(A) ' Prob(B)).

Proof of (33). Recall the definition of Prob(B | −) : Prob(A)→ U by
Prob(B | a) :≡ ∑
y:Prob(A×B)
(impprA(y) =Prob(A) a).
Now define
g ≡ h :≡ λ〈a, x〉. pr1(x) :
∑
a:Prob(A)
Prob(B | a)→ Prob(A×B),
where pr1 : Prob(B | a) → Prob(A × B) is defined as the projection onto the first
coordinate of the ∑-type Prob(B | a) ≡ ∑y:Prob(A×B)(impprA(y) =Prob(A) a),
pr1 :
∑
y:Prob(A×B)
(impprA(y) =Prob(A) a)→ Prob(A×B)
pr1(〈y, p〉) :≡ y.
We construct an inhabitant of
(g ◦ cond) ∼ idProb(A×B) :≡
∏
y:Prob(A×B)
((g ◦ cond)(y) =Prob(A×B) y)
by observing that cond(y) ≡ 〈impprA(y), 〈y, reflimpprA (y)〉〉, whence g(cond(y)) ≡ y :
Prob(A×B) and
λy.refly : (g ◦ cond) ∼ idProb(A×B) .
It remains to prove that
(cond ◦ h) ∼ id∑
a:Prob(A)Prob(B|a) .
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Note first that
(cond ◦ h)(〈a, 〈y, p〉〉) :≡ 〈impprA(y), 〈y, reflimpprA (y)〉〉.
By the elimination rule for ∑-types, it is enough to prove∏
〈a,〈y,p〉〉:
∑
a:Prob(A)Prob(B|a)
〈a, 〈y, p〉〉 = 〈impprA(y), 〈y, reflimpprA (y)〉〉.
First note that∑
a:Prob(A)
Prob(B | a) ' ∑
z:Prob(A)×Prob(A×B)
(impprA(prProb(A×B)(z)) = prA(z)).
By the elimination rule for product types, we can assume z = 〈a, y〉 for a : Prob(A)
and y : Prob(A×B) so that∑
a:Prob(A)
Prob(B | a) ' ∑
〈a,y〉:Prob(A)×Prob(A×B)
(impprA(y) = a).
Now, given any 〈a, 〈y, p〉〉 : ∑a:Prob(A)Prob(B | a), we immediately have p :
impprA(y) = a, and thus p
−1 : a = impprA(y), refly : y = y, and
pair=(p−1, refly) : 〈a, y〉 = 〈impprA(y), y〉,
with pair= as defined in [Uni13, Theorem 2.6.2]. By Theorem 2.7.2 in [Uni13], it
remains to show that
(45) transportC(pair=(p−1, refly), p−1) = reflimpprA (y),
for C : Prob(A)×Prob(A×B)→ U defined by
C(〈a, y〉) :≡ a =Prob(A) impprA(y).
We argue by based path induction as follows.
Fix 〈a, 〈y, p〉〉 : ∑a:Prob(A)Prob(B | a) and define
D :
∏
〈a′,y′〉:Prob(A)×Prob(A×B)
(〈a′, y′〉 = 〈impprA(y), y〉)→ U
D(〈a′, y′〉, p′) :≡ transportC(p′, apprA(p
′)) = reflimpprA (y).
Arguing by based path induction at 〈impprA(y), y〉, we can assume 〈a′, y′〉 ≡ 〈impprA(y), y〉,
so that
D(〈impprA(y), y〉, refl〈impprA (y),y〉) ≡
≡ transportC(refl〈impprA (y),y〉, apprA(refl〈impprA (y),y〉)) = reflimpprA (y)
≡ apprA(refl〈impprA (y),y〉) = reflimpprA (y),
for which we have an inhabitant by the propositional computation rule for pair=; see
[Uni13, p. 106].
By based path induction, we have an inhabitant of D(z, p′) for every z : Prob(A)×
Prob(A × B) and p′ : z = 〈impprA(y), y〉. In particular, for z ≡ 〈a, y〉, with a :
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Prob(A), y : Prob(A×B), and p′ ≡ pair=(p−1, refly), we have an inhabitant
d : D(〈a, y〉, pair=(p−1, refly)) ≡
≡ transportC(pair=(p−1, refly), apprA(pair
=(p−1, refly))) = reflimpprA (y).
Again by the propositional computation rule for pair=, we have an inhabitant
r : apprA(pair
=(p−1, refly)) = p−1.
And thus, by applying the transport function to the path r, we have
aptransportC(pair=(p−1,refly),−)(r) :
transportC(pair=(p−1, refly), apprA(pair
=(p−1, refly))) =
= transportC(pair=(p−1, refly), p−1).
By path concatenation, we obtain
aptransportC(pair=(p−1,refly),−)(r)
−1 • d :
transportC(pair=(p−1, refly), p−1) = reflimpprA (y),
as required by (45).

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